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INJURIES TO THIRD PARTIES ARISING FROM
OIL & GAS OPERATIONS: AN ANALYTICAL




Given the large number of independent contractors who
typically work on location, oil and gas operators are frequently faced
with the possibility of liability to third parties who are injured during
operations on the lease premises or easement. Many operators,
particularly the larger ones, require contractors to execute master
service agreements that contain indemnity and insurance clauses
obligating the contractor and its insurer to indemnify the operator.
Every jurisdiction is different in its consideration of indemnity
obligations. These differences ensure that choice of law issues remain
paramount.
This article does not purport to be authoritative on every
indemnity-related law or statute in every jurisdiction. In fact, the law
of Texas is given particular attention. However, an analytical
framework can be developed, through this article, to guide the analysis
of an indemnity obligation in any jurisdiction. The four issues critical
in drafting, construing, and enforcing an indemnity obligation are: 1)
whether the common law in the relevant jurisdiction limits the
enforceability of indemnity clauses; 2) whether the jurisdiction has, by
statute, limited the enforceability of the indemnity obligation; 3)
whether the indemnity is backed by insurance coverage; and 4) whether
the owner or operator is designated as an additional insured on the
contractor's general liability policy. This article examines these four
issues.
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I. TERMINOLOGY
A brief review of terminology is appropriate. To indemnify
means:
To restore the victim of a loss, in whole or in part, by
payment, repair, or replacement. To save harmless; to
secure against loss or damage; to give security for the
reimbursement of a person in case of an anticipated
loss falling upon him. To make good; to compensate;
to make reimbursement to one of a loss already
occurred by him.'
An indemnitee is the person to be indemnified or protected by
the other.2 An indemnitor is the person who is bound to indemnify or
protect the other.
3
Commercial General Liability ("CGL") insurance protects
against losses due to bodily injury and property damage, and often
covers libel, slander, trespass, or other similar actions. An oil and gas
operator should look for minimum coverages that include underground
resources and equipment coverage, pollution coverage, personal injury,
and any other endorsements that are unique to the operator's business.
Excess or "umbrella" coverage may be purchased to cover
liabilities in excess of the CGL policy. The operator should insure that
the umbrella policy follows the same coverages of the CGL policy.
II. ROLE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE
Most jurisdictions require employers to carry workers'
compensation insurance to protect employees who are injured on the
job. In exchange for the provision of no fault insurance, injured
employees are usually barred from suing their employers.4 In some
jurisdictions, claims against the employer are still allowed in certain
limited circumstances such as intentional tort or wrongful death caused
by the employer's gross negligence.5




4This principle is sometimes called "the comp bar."
5See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-8 (Michie 1978).
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In addition to barring the employee's action against the
employer, workers' compensation law may bar all third party actions
against the employer in the absence of an express contract of
indemnity.6 Courts may engage in a balancing of the equities, but
freedom of contract is a hallowed principle. For example, in City of
Artesia v. Carter,7 the New Mexico Court of Appeals balanced the
competing policy considerations of protecting the employer and
enforcing contracts and concluded that an employer may voluntarily
relinquish the protection provided by the statute.8
Due to the somewhat limited recoveries that may be allowed
under the workers' compensation scheme, injured employees of
contractors have some incentive to seek recovery against the owner or
operator of the premises.
IIl. POTENTIAL BASES FOR LIABILITY
The preferable basis for liability in an injury claim by a third
party contractor is premises liability.9 The right of control over the
premises is the critical factor that determines liability.' ° Courts will
look to the contract between the operator and the contractor to
determine which party had the right of control over the conduct giving
rise to the plaintiffs injury." Thus, the contract is critical. In the
absence of a contract, courts will look to the facts and circumstances to
determine which party had the right of control. 2 To the extent that an
operator's representative requires a contractor to comply with the
operator's safety standards, the operator may have exercised sufficient
control to subject it to liability.'3 Thus, paradoxically, the greater
degree of control that is exercised in an effort to meet safety
requirements, the more likely the operator will be held liable if an
accident occurs.'
4
6See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. 52-1-8 (Michie 1978); Beal v. Southern Union Gas
Co.,304 P.2d 566,568 (N.M.1956); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Southern California Petroleum Corp.,
353 P.2d 358, 364 (N.M.1960).
'610 P.2d 198 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)
8See id. at 201.
9See Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.w.2d 415 (Tex. 1985).
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In most jurisdictions, an owner or occupier of land has a duty
to use reasonable care to maintain the safety of the premises for
business invitees.'5 A general contractor in control of the premises is
charged with the same duty as an owner or occupier. 6 State law
regarding an owner or occupier's duty may vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction; as such, the careful practitioner must determine the
relevant duty of care.
A general contractor in control of the premises may be liable
for two types of negligence in failing to keep the premises safe: (1)
injury arising from an activity on the premises; and (2) injury arising
from a premises defect.17
Premises defect cases further fall into two distinct categories:
(1) defects that exist on the premises when the invitee entered or that
are created through some means unrelated to the activity of the injured
employee or the independent contractor; and (2) defects created by the
work activity of the injured employee or contractor."
In the first case, the contractor has a duty to inspect the
premises and warn the invitee of dangerous conditions about which the
general contractor knew or should have known.' 9 In the second case,
the general contractor ordinarily has no duty to warn the independent
contractor's employees unless the independent contractor retains
control over the condition or activity that caused the injury.2 This
principle is demonstrated by the leading case of Exxon Corp. v.
Tidwell,2t wherein the Texas Supreme Court announced a new legal
standard for suits alleging failure to maintain a safe workplace: the
right to control the safety and security of the premises determines an oil
"An "invitee" is a person who is on the premises at the express or implied invitation
of the possessor of the premises and who has entered thereon either as a member of the public for
a purpose for which the premises are held open to the public or for a purpose connected with the
business of the possessor that does or may result in their mutual economic benefit. See, e.g. TEXAS
PATTERN JURY CHARGE: MALPRACTICE, PREMISES, PRODUCTS 66.5 (1998).
"6See Redinger, 689 S.W.2d at 417.
"See id.
"RSee Shell Chemical Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Tex. 1973); Clayton W.
Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo, 952 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex. 1997).
19See Olivo, 952 S.W.2d at 527.
2 See id. at 527-28 (stating "[flor the general contractor to be liable for negligence, its
supervisory control must relate to the condition or activity that caused the injury."). Olivo
recognizes that Williams had "overlapping" duties as both occupier of land and general contractor
who hired the independent contractor. See id. at 527. Because the duty is the same, the terms
"general contractor" and "occupier" will be used interchangeably in this analysis, as they are in
many of the cases. See id.
21867 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1993).
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company's liability for a third party suit against a station attendant.22
As demonstrated by Olivo, the more specifically the activity can be
characterized, the less likely that the occupier or general contractor will
be found to control the details of the work.23
In summary, for those defects created by the contractor's work
activity, the premises occupier has no duty unless he has exercised
supervisory control over the condition or activity that caused the
injury.2' However, to the extent that a safety policy requires
compliance with the operator's safety standards, the policy mAy
establish sufficient control to subject the operator to liability.25
IV. BASES FOR INDEMNITY
Indemnification in the field of oil production is generally based
on contract; however, some jurisdictions recognize equitable
indemnification under certain circumstances. 26 For example, an implied
contractual indemnity may arise when one party to an agreement
breaches a duty to the other party, and the non-breaching party is then
held liable to a third party.
27
Indemnity may also be permitted on equitable grounds. This
theory is sometimes referred to as the "active-passive" theory and
provides that if the fault of one party substantially outweighs the fault
of another who incurs the liability indemnity will be allowed to protect
the passively negligent party.28 Some jurisdictions recognize "equitable
apportionment" where partial indemnification is allowed based upon
the relative degrees of fault.29 Other jurisdictions do not recognize
equitable apportionment.3 ° However, equitable principles of indemnity
will not prevail over express contractual provisions.3
22See id. at 23. Tidwell further notes that liability is no longer determined by general
control over operations, but control over security and safety. See id.23See Olivo, 952 S.W.2d at 528.24See id..
25See id.26See, e.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956)
27See id. at 125.
2See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B (1979).29See DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 26.07 (1982).
"See King & Johnson Rental Equip. Co. v. Pima County Superior Ct., 599 P.2d 212
(Ariz. 1979).
3 See City & Borough of Juneau v. Alaska Elec. Light & Power Co., 622 P.2d 954
(Alaska 1981).
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V. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The rules for construction and interpretation of indemnity
clauses are similar to those for contractual provisions in general. An
indemnity clause is to be interpreted according to the plain meaning of
the language employed, unless the language used is so ambiguous that
it must be interpreted in light of the surrounding circumstances to
effectuate the parties' intent.32 Although insurance contracts are
normally construed against the insurer, an indemnity provision may be
construed against the indemnitee and not against the indemnitor.33 In
addition, the enforceability of indemnity provisions may be affected by
common law, statutes, and related insurance obligations.
A. Does the Common Law Limit the Enforceability of Indemnity
Provisions?
Some jurisdictions place common law limitations on the
enforceability of indemnity provisions. Of particular concern is an
agreement to indemnify the indemnitee for its own negligence. The two
most important common law doctrines in this area are the "express
negligence" test and the "clear and unequivocal" test.
1. The Express Negligence Test
Texas is an example of a jurisdiction that has adopted the
express negligence doctrine.34 The express negligence test requires
parties to state their intent in specific terms within the four corners of
the contract in order to indemnify the indemnitee from the
consequences of its own negligence.35 Indemnitees seeking such
indemnity, which causes injury jointly and concurrently along with the
indemnitor's negligence, must also pass the express negligence test.
36
In Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Const. Co.,3 the court held that the
following contract language fails the express negligence test:
32 See W.E. Rasmussen, Insurance and Indemnification Provisions and Mining
Contracts, 31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. LAW. INST. § 11.021] (1985) (citing May v. Chicago Ins. Co.,
490 P. 2d 150 (Or. 1971)); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Newton, 456 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1972).
33See DOOLEY, supra note 29, at § 26.04.
'See Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Const. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987).
3 See id. at 708; see also Dresser Inds., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505,
508 (Tex. 1993).
36See Ethyl Corp., 725 S.W.2d at 708.
17725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987).
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Contractor shall indemnify and hold Owner harmless
against any loss or damage to persons or property as
a result of operations growing out of the performance
of this contract and caused by the negligence or
carelessness of Contractor, Contractor's employees,
Subcontractors, and agents or licensees.3"
The court rejected Ethyl's argument that the language "any loss" and
"as a result of operations" demonstrated an intent to cover its own
negligence.39
The following language, however, has been held to comply with
the express negligence test:
[Owner] agrees to indemnify Contractor against all
bodily injury, death and property claims by its
employees or the employees of its contractors "without
limit and without regard to the cause or causes thereof
or the negligence of any party or parties.'4
Indemnity provisions which do not meet the express negligence
test may be unenforceable as a matter of law.4' Some master service
agreements contain a "savings clause," which purports to sever any
portion of the indemnity provision that is held to be unenforceable, and
requires the enforcement of the remaining obligation. Again, results
vary by jurisdiction. For example, in Sierra v. Garcia,42 the New
Mexico Supreme Court refused to sever objectionable provisions and
held that the entire contract was voided by the construction indemnity
statute. Michigan courts, however, attempt to reform a contract to
eliminate offensive provisions." In Fisk Electric Co. v. Constructors
& Associates, Inc. 45 and Gulf Coast Masonry, Inc. v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc.,46 the Texas Supreme Court invalidated the entire indemnity
obligation, but it is unclear if either contract contained a savings
provision.
381d. at 707.
31See id. at 708.
'Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc., 817 S.w.2d 50, 56 (Tex. 1991).4 See Ethyl Corp., 725 S.W.2d at 708.
42746 P. 2d 1105 (N.M.1987)
43See id. at 1108.
"See Robertson v. Swindell-Dressler Co., 267 N.W.2d 131,140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
4'888 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. 1994).
46739 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam).
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2. The Clear and Unequivocal Test
New Mexico is an example of a jurisdiction that has rejected
the express negligence test in favor of the clear and unequivocal test."'
An express reference to the indemnitee's own negligence is not required
so long as the parties' intent to include all damages arising out of the
activity is clear.48 Therefore, the language "indemnify and hold
harmless against all actions, suits, demands, damages, losses or
expenses" is sufficient in New Mexico.49
B. Does the Jurisdiction's Statutory Scheme Limit the Enforceability
of Indemnity Obligations?
Some states, including but not necessarily limited to the
following, have enacted so called anti-indemnity statutes that
specifically apply to oil and gas operations:
Texas - TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 127.003 (Vernon 1997).
Louisiana - LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 9:2780 (West 1999).
New Mexico - N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2 (1978).50
Wyoming - WYo. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-131 (1999).
Oregon - OR. REV. STAT. § 30.140 (1999).
Some states have construction or real estate indemnity statutes
that may or may not be implicated by oil and gas operations. For
example, New Mexico has a statute that applies broadly to
,,improvements.,,5
.Like the oilfield statute, the New Mexico real estate anti-
indemnity statute generally voids contractual indemnity provisions, but
instead of being limited to wells and mines, it covers most any
improvement to land:
Any provision, contained in any agreement relating to
... the modification, repair, [or] maintenance ... of
47See Metropolitan Paving Co. v. Gordon Herkenhoff & Assoc. lnc.,341 P.2d 460
(N.M.1959.)
4See id. at 463.
49Eichel v. Goode, Inc.,680 P.2d 627, 633 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
'0 The New Mexico statute was amended by House Bill 861 (H.B. 861), passed by the
44th Legislature and signed into law on April 5, 1999.
"See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-1 (Michie 1978).
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any real property, or any improvement of any kind
whether on, above or under real property, including
without limitation, buildings, shafts, wells and
structures, by which any party... agrees to indemnify
• . .against liability, claims, damages, losses, or
expenses... arising out of bodily injury... or damage
to property... is against public policy and void and
unenforceable. 52
Black's Law Dictionary defines an improvement as any
"valuable addition made to property... amounting to more than mere
repairs . . [and includes] any permanent structure or other
development."53 Black's defines a "structure" as "any construction, or
any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of
parts joined together in some definite manner."54 Although this statute
has not been applied to oil and gas operations to the authors'
knowledge, the definitions seem to be broad enough to encompass the
same.
The careful practitioner will check the particular jurisdiction
for applicable statutory limitations. The importance of this issue is
demonstrated by contrasting the laws of New Mexico and Texas. Both
Texas and New Mexico have adopted anti-indemnity statutes relating
to the oil and gas industry. The New Mexico statute, adopted first,
served as a pattern for the Texas statute." However, the Texas statute
was subsequently amended to add greater detail that has not been
adopted by the legislature of New Mexico.56
The scope of the anti-indemnity statutes varies greatly and must
be examined in the relevantjurisdiction. For example, the Texas statute
specifically excludes "gathering, storing, or transporting gas or natural
gas liquids by pipeline or fixed associated facilities," and "construction,
maintenance, or repair of oil, natural gas liquids, or gas pipelines or of
521d.
S3BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 757 (6th ed. 1990).
54d. at 1424; see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2267 (defining a structure as "something built or constructed").
"See Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of North Ar., 845 S.W.2d 794, 805 (Tex. 1992)
(citing HOUSE INTERIM STUDY COMMITTEE ON HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENTS, REPORT, 63rd
Leg., at i, 7 (1973)).
'See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., Inc., 755 P.2d 52,55 (N. M. 1988). The
court stated, "The Texas statute, however, is not our statute, and it is not our duty to read the
legislative enactments of New Mexico through the eyes of the legislature of Texas." See id.
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fixed associated facilities." 57 The term "fixed associated facilities" has
not been defined by any Texas court.5 Even before the statute's
amendment to add the "fixed associated facilities" provision, two Texas
cases had held that the statute did not apply to pipeline-related
activities. 9
The New Mexico oilfield anti-indemnity statute voids
contractual indemnity provisions that are part of an "agreement
pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water, or any mine for any
mineral."6 The legislation seems to codify Amoco Production Co. v.
Action Well Serv., Inc.6t and confirms that applicable parties cannot use
additional insured provisions to circumvent the prohibition on
indemnity.62 The former statute contained language that specified it
"shall not affect the validity of any insurance contract or any benefit
conferred by the Workmen's Compensation Act., 63 This language is
struck from the new statute, and the following provision has been
added:
A provision in an insurance contract [sic] indemnity
agreement naming a person as an additional insured or
a provision in an insurance contract or any other
contract requiring a waiver of rights of subrogation or
otherwise having the effect of imposing a duty of
indemnification on the primary insured party that
would, if it were a direct or collateral agreement
described in subsections A and B of this section, be
void, is against public policy and void.'
51TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 127.001(4)(B) (Vernon 1997).
"See Hunter H. White, Winding Your Way Through the Texas Oilfield Anti-indemnity
Statute, The Fair Notice Requirements and Other Indemnity Related Issues, 37 S. TEx. L. REV.
161, n.18 (1996).
"See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Brad & Sons Constr., 841 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(holding that a repair of a leaking natural gas pipeline, where the leak was approximately 800 feet
from the nearest gas well, does not fall under the anti-indemnity provision); Singleton v. Crown
Central Petroleum Corp., 713 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985), rev'don other
grounds, 729 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1987) (concluding that Texas statute does not apply to a
construction contract providing for indemnification of the gas plant owner by a contractor for an
accident caused by the rupture of a pipe).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2(A) (Michie 1978).
6'755 P.2d 52 (N.M. 1988).
"See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2-(A).
"Id. at 56-7-2(A)(4).
"H.B. 861 (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-2(C)).
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This provision apparently responds to an issue that has divided
New Mexico courts and created a conflict with Texas law, often the
standard for oil and gas transactions.
In Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Company ofNorth America," the
Texas Supreme Court held that an "additional insured provision which
does not support an indemnity agreement is not prohibited by" the
Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Statute.' The court examined the
structure of the contract to reach the conclusion that the additional
insurance provision constitutes an obligation separate from the
unenforceable indemnity provision.67 Two opinions by federal courts
in New Mexico are in accordance with the Texas result that insurance
requirements are not invalidated by the anti-indemnity statute.6"
However, in Amoco Production Co., the New Mexico Supreme Court
bluntly rejected previous federal interpretations and held essentially
that insurance requirements cannot be used to circumvent the anti-
indemnity statute.69 New Mexico House Bill 861 appears to codify the
holding in Amoco that there is no distinction between the obligation to
indemnify and the obligation to insure.7" In other words, in New
Mexico at least, insurance requirements cannot be used to circumvent
the anti-indemnity statute.
C. Is the Indemnity Obligation supported by Insurance?
The right of indemnity is only worth the financial resources of
the indemnitor. Operators often require contractors to maintain certain
insurance coverages. However, unless the operator is named as an
additional insured, the operator has only indirect coverage to the extent
that the contractor is found liable to the operator. By requiring itself to
be named as an additional insured, the operator has a direct claim for
coverage verified by the insurer.
65845 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1992).
66d. at 804.
67See id. The court expressed no opinion regarding whether the buyer was indeed an
additional insured under the seller's insurance policies or the existence or extent of any coverage.
See id. at 806.
"See Herrera v. Amoco Production Co., 623 F. Supp. 378,380 (D.N.M. 1985); Brashar
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 626 F. Supp. 434,436 (D.N.M.1984).
'See Amoco, 755 P.2d at 55.
°See H.B. 861 (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-2(C)).
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D. Is the Operator Designated as an Additional Insured on the
Contractor's Policy?
A common provision in master service agreements is the
requirement that the contractor name the operator as an additional
insured on insurance when the contractors are contractually obligated
to maintain the insurance.7 It is critical that the required coverages are
verified following execution of the master service agreement. A
common fact scenario is the contractor's failure to name the operator
as an additional insured. Again, jurisdictions vary on the consequences
of the failure. The key issue is whether the additional insured provision
is solely in support of an indemnity provision (which may be
unenforceable for one of the reasons previously discussed) or whether
the duty to make the operator an additional insured is a separate
obligation.72 Judicial outcomes are not always consistent or easy to
reconcile.
The Texas Supreme Court has held that "an additional insured
provision that does not support an indemnity agreement is not
prohibited by" the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Statute.73 The court
examined the structure of the contract to reach the conclusion that the
additional insurance provision constitutes an obligation separate from
the unenforceable indemnity provision.74
Getty contrasts with the earlier case of Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co. v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co.75 Fireman's
Fund was a declaratory judgment action to determine whether a
contractor, and its insurer who settled the claim of a subcontractor's
employee against the premises owner, was entitled to indemnity from
the subcontractor.76 Applying the clear and unequivocal test, as
required before the adoption of the express negligence test, the court
held that the indemnity provision was invalid.77 The court also rejected
the argument that the requirement that the subcontractor carry liability
insurance in favor of the owner indicated an intent to cover the owner's
negligent acts.78 The court wrote:
"See Lloyd's of London v. Oryx Energy Co., 142 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1998).
7'See id. at 257.
7See Getty Oil Co., 845 S.W.2d at 804.
74See id. at 806.
5490 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1972).
76See id. at 819.
7"See id. at 823.
78See id. at 823.
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While the meaning of the contract provisions relating
to liability insurance are not clear, the most reasonable
construction is that they were to assure performance of
the indemnification agreement as entered into by the
parties. Such provisions are often required to guard
against insolvency of the indemnitor, and they should
not be considered as any evidence of intent to broaden
the contractual indemnity obligations.79
In order to reach the contrary result in Getty, the court found
that the contract in issue was "significantly different from that in
Fireman's Fund.""0 First, the Getty contract contains an "insurance
provision separate from and additional to the additional insured
provision."'" Further, the additional insured provision of the Getty
contract required the seller to extend insurance coverage to Getty
"whether or not required [by the other provisions of the contract]."82
Getty and Fireman's Fund are contrasted in Emery Air Freight Corp.
v. General Transport. Systems, Inc.,83 where the court of appeals upheld
a summary judgment in favor of a contractor for failure to name Emery
as an additional insured.84 The court held that the contract in issue
more closely resembles the contract in Fireman 's Fund than in Getty
because "it has no internal insurance provision" and the insurance
provision "does not require coverage 'whether or not required' by other
clauses."85  As demonstrated by these two cases, the interaction of
the indemnity and insurance provisions is critical and may rest on
technical distinctions.
VI. CHOICE OF LAW CONSIDERATIONS
A detailed analysis in the area of conflicts of law, in the
absence of an effective choice of law, is beyond the scope of this paper.
In general, courts will give effect to a choice of law unless it presents
7id.
'Getty Oil Co., 845 S.W.2d at 804.
"Id. at 804
921d.
'"933 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996).
"See id. at 313.
"Id. at 315.
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a conflict with the fundamental public policy of the forum state.s
Again, judicial outcomes have not always been consistent. In Brashar,
for example, a federal district court considered the enforceability of an
indemnity provision which the court held was governed by Texas law.87
The court compared the results under the New Mexico and Texas anti-
indemnity statutes and concluded that application of Texas law would
not conflict with New Mexico public policy."8 The Tenth Circuit,
however, invalidated an indemnification provision in a construction
contract entered into in California because the court found the provision
to be against New Mexico public policy. 9
Under the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, a court may
reject the parties' choice of law if the choice has no relation to the
transaction and the choice of law is otherwise unreasonable:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern
their contractual rights and duties will be applied...
unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial
relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no reasonable
basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) the application of the law of the
chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy [of the forum
state]. 9'
A choice of law provision may seem like a quick fix for an
operator who maintains operations in more than one state. However,
"See Brasharv. Mobil Oil Corp., 626 F. Supp. 434,437 (D.N.M. 1984). Accord Eichel
v. Goode, Inc., 101 N.M. 246, 251, 680 P.2d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)(stating that application
of Florida law to invalidate an indemnity clause, which did not meet the express negligence test
but would have been valid underNew Mexico's clear and unequivocal test, does not conflict with
New Mexico public policy); Reagan v. McGee Drilling Corp., 933 P.2d 867 (N.M. Ct. App.
i 997)(stating that application of Texas law upholding contractual indemnity clause that was valid
under Texas law but invalid under New Mexico law does not violate public policy of New
Mexico).
7See 626 F. Supp.at 437.
' See id.
"'SeeTucker v. R.A. Hanson Co., Inc., 956 F.2d 215, 219 (10th Cir. 1992). It should
be noted, however, that the contract did not contain a choice of law provision. See id.
'DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).
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consideration must be given to the enforceability of the provision in
each jurisdiction in which it is likely to be tested.
VII. CONCLUSION
Indemnity issues can be complex and the result may vary from
jurisdiction tojurisdiction. However, by systematically asking the right
questions, the careful practitioner can determine the outcome in any
jurisdiction.
1. Does the common law limit the enforceability of
indemnity clauses?
2. Does the jurisdiction have statutory limits on the
enforceability of indemnity obligation?
3. Is the indemnity backed by insurance coverage?
4. Is the owner or operator designated as an additional
insured on the contractor's general liability policy?
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